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Abstract: 
Carl von Clausewitz was both an avid analyst of small wars and people’s war and, 
during the wars of liberation, a practitioner of small war. While Clausewitz 
scholars have increasingly recognised the centrality of small wars for Clausewitz’s 
thought, the sources and inspirations of his writings on small wars have remained 
understudied. This article contextualises Clausewitz’s thought on small wars and 
people’s war in the tradition of German philosophical and aesthetic discourses 
around 1800. It shows how Clausewitz developed core concepts such as the 
integration of passion and reason and the idea of war in its ‘absolute perfection’ as 
a regulative ideal in the framework of his works on small wars and people’s war. 
Contextualising Clausewitz inevitably distances him from the twenty-first-century 
strategic context, but, as this article shows, it can help us to ask pertinent questions 
about the configuration of society, the armed forces and the government in today’s 
Western states. 
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Introduction 
The classical perception of Carl von Clausewitz up to 1976 was one that depicted 
him as the paradigmatic thinker of regular interstate wars. Since 1976, the year 
that saw the publication of two seminal books on Clausewitz, Peter Paret’s 
Clausewitz and the State and Raymond Aron’s Penser la guerre, Clausewitz 
scholarship has moved on considerably.1 The Clausewitz reception in the past 
                                                        
1 Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); Raymond Aron, Clausewitz: 
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decade has continued the appreciation of Clausewitz as a thinker of small wars as 
well as large wars. It has acknowledged that Clausewitz himself did not subscribe 
to a binary view of war that distinguishes between these two as fundamentally 
different forms of war.2 Beatrice Heuser’s work on Clausewitz as a thinker who 
lived at a ‘watershed’ moment between partisan warfare and people’s war also 
emphasized the centrality of small wars for Clausewitz’s thought.3 
 
This article expands the study of Clausewitz’s analysis of small wars by 
highlighting the relevance of moral and aesthetic elements for this analysis. It 
demonstrates how Clausewitz engaged with his contemporary aesthetic and 
philosophical context, in particular the ideas of Kant and Schiller, in order to 
understand the transformation of small wars from partisan warfare to people’s 
war that occurred during his lifetime. Clausewitz developed his understanding of 
people’s war – ‘the most beautiful of wars’  [‘der schönste aller Kriege’]4 – as war in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Philosopher or War (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976). See also Hew 
Strachan, ‘Clausewitz en anglais: la césure de 1976’, in Laure Bardiès and Martin 
Motte (eds), École pratique De la guerre? Clausewitz et la pensée stratégique 
contemporaine (Paris: Economica, 2008), 81-122. 
2 Hew Strachan, Carl von Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography (New York: Atlantic 
Books, 2007); Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle: The Political Theory of 
War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Antulio J Echevarria II, Clausewitz 
and Contemporary War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Christopher 
Daase, ‘Clausewitz and Small Wars’, in Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe 
(eds), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), pp. 182-195. 
3 Beatrice Heuser, ‘Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed between 
Partisan War and People’s War’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33:1 (2010), pp. 139-
62. See also the contributions in the special issue of Small Wars and Insurgencies 
25:4 (2014) ‘The Origins of Small Wars: From Special Operations to Ideological 
Insurgencies’. 
4 ‘Ein ungenannter Militär an Fichte’, printed in Carl von Clausewitz: Geist und Tat, 
edited by Walther Malmsten Schering (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1941), p. 
71. 
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its existential form in what we could call a dialogical process with Kantian and 
post-Kantian philosophy around 1800. The phenomenon of people’s war 
confronted Clausewitz with the question of how to integrate and harmonize 
passion and reason, which was at the same time one of the core problems of post-
Kantian philosophy in Germany. What this article shows is that Clausewitz 
developed his idea of reason and passion as potentially opposite human faculties 
that have to be integrated in some way in his early writings on small wars. This 
idea was to become highly relevant in the framework of On War, specifically in 
Clausewitz’s trinity of passion, reason and chance and creativity.5 Even though 
tracing the connections between Clausewitz’s conception of small wars and his 
magnum opus, On War, in a systematic fashion is beyond the limits of this article, it 
prepares the ground for such an endeavour and provides glimpses of the outcomes 
that such a study may produce. 
 
This article follows Paret’s argument that contextualizing Clausewitz is crucial to 
understanding his work.6 However, contextualizing Clausewitz’s writings on small 
wars and people’s war inevitably distances them from the contemporary strategic 
context. It implies that Clausewitz’s ‘wisdom’ may not indeed be timeless. 
Clausewitz wrote primarily with a view to Prussia’s political and strategic situation 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when Prussia’s survival was at stake. 
People’s war, and the inclusion of the people in the defence of their country – their 
nation – was Clausewitz’s solution to Prussia’s strategic problems. But a contextual 
approach to Clausewitz’s writings can open up new perspectives on contemporary 
strategic problems: it prompts us to think, for instance, about the way in which 
                                                        
5 See also Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War 
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008), pp. 121ff. Sumida recognizes the 
relevance of small wars for Clausewitz’s theory of war; however, he fails to grasp 
the importance of Clausewitz’s engagement with his intellectual context in this 
respect and claims that Clausewitz was a largely idiosyncratic thinker.  
6 Peter Paret, ‘Text and Context: Two Paths to Clausewitz’, in Clausewitz in His 
Time: Essays in the Cultural and Intellectual History of Thinking about War (New 
York: Berghahn, 2015), p. 5-17.  
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reason and passion are integrated in today’s wars in which western states are 
involved.  
 
Yet, a contextualization of Clausewitz in the methodological tradition of Quentin 
Skinner’s approach to intellectual history can only go so far, as it is difficult to 
discern Clausewitz’s ‘intentions’ from his work given that he often seemed to 
eschew positioning himself intellectually and politically. 7   The alternative, 
poststructuralist approach to intellectual history as a ‘map of misreadings’ and an 
iterative and productive process of ‘reading sense’ into classical thinkers through 
the eyes of the contemporary reader is not a viable methodological option either.8 
If the poststructuralist announcement of the ‘death of the author’ does not 
consciously call for a selective and self-serving interpretation of Clausewitz, at 
least it offers little hope of being able to avoid the pitfalls of such an approach.  
 
The solution to this dilemma consists in constructing a methodological middle 
ground between Skinner’s contextualism and the poststructuralist perspectives 
associated with Barthes, Foucault and Derrida. This middle ground lies in 
acknowledging that contemporary readers can analyse Clausewitz’s actions 
(including speech acts) as a soldier, reformer and theorist of war, even though his 
intentions often remain opaque.9 It acknowledges both the agency of the historical 
subject, Clausewitz, and the interpreters’ own agency as a historically 
contextualized individual. Put simply, Clausewitz was an avid reader and there is 
evidence that he engaged – intellectually and/or politically – in many debates of 
his time, but he was not an empty receptacle of others’ ideas or a mouthpiece of 
any tradition of thought. He absorbed notions and concepts that emerged in his 
time, but he also transformed them and integrated them into his oeuvre in a partly 
                                                        
7 Cf. Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, History 
and Theory 8:1 (1969), pp. 3-53. More recently Skinner, Visions of Politics, vol. I 
Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
8 Cf. Graham Allen, Intertextuality (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 68ff. 
9 Cf. Tony Burns, ‘Interpreting and Appropriating Texts in the History of Political 
Thought: Quentin Skinner and Poststructuralism’, Contemporary Political Theory 
10:3 (2011), pp. 313-331. 
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idiosyncratic way. What this study seeks to establish is hence not ‘influence’ by, 
but engagement with his context. The Russian linguist Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of 
dialogism is useful in this respect.10 The dialogical perspective suggests that 
reading Clausewitz’s texts is akin to overhearing a person speaking on the phone: 
we can only observe one side of the dialogue. The contemporary interpreter of 
Clausewitz’s writings hence possesses agency too, in that s/he actively has to 
reconstruct the other side of the dialogue. But this agency is not boundless; on the 
contrary, it is limited. The reconstruction has to make sense against the 
background of the manifest side of the dialogue as well as against the background 
of the specific historical context of the dialogue. 
 
The remainder of this article proceeds in four steps: the next section introduces 
Clausewitz’s cultural, philosophical and political context as far as this is possible on 
the basis of his writings, notes and correspondence.  It indicates the extent to 
which Clausewitz was exposed, intellectually as well as socially, to the turn of the 
century philosophical debates. The second part moves on to a reconstruction of 
what Clausewitz referred to as the ‘most beautiful of wars’ – defensive people’s 
war. It draws upon Kantian aesthetics and, in particular, Schiller’s aesthetic theory. 
The third and final section outlines how arguments and themes from Clausewitz’s 
conception of small wars and people’s war stemming from the reform years 
continued to play a role in the context of his later writings on small wars and 
people’s war. The conclusion summarizes the article’s main arguments and 
discusses to what extent Clausewitz’s analysis of small wars can be relevant for 
today’s strategic debates. 
 
 
Clausewitz’s cultural, philosophical and political context 
 
Clausewitz’s early educational background was untypical for the role and status he 
was to assume later in his life. In 1807, he wrote to his then fiancée (and later 
wife), Marie von Brühl: 
                                                        
10 Allen (2000), pp. 21ff. 
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Take into account that I am a son of the military camp, the real one, that is, not one 
from Schiller’s poetic world like Max Piccolomini. […] I could have turned out worse, 
I grant you that; however, the protection of a diligent education, under the guidance 
of a worthy friend, could have conferred a purer content upon my background, could 
have developed my intellectual strengths more thoroughly and could have equipped 
me with knowledge and an aesthetic education.11 
Even though Clausewitz is entirely honest about his lack of a formal education in 
early life, the ease with which he slips in a reference to Schiller’s Wallenstein 
illustrates that, at the age of twenty-seven, he was well-studied. The fact that he 
had eventually found that ‘worthy friend’ in Gerhard von Scharnhorst, who was 
Clausewitz’s instructor at the Allgemeine Kriegsschule in Berlin between 1801 and 
1804 and became his lifelong mentor, had played a large part in this. Scharnhorst 
imbued Clausewitz with a fiercely critical theoretical perspective and an acute 
sense for the relevance of history to the study of war.12 Johann Gottfried 
Kiesewetter, a popularizer of Kant’s writings, lectured on logic and mathematics at 
the Allgemeine Kriegsschule. Clausewitz deepened his study of Kant by also 
attending Kiesewetter’s lectures in the Pépinière, the Prussian academy for army 
surgeons.13 The influence of Kantian philosophy on Clausewitz’s own writings, in 
particular in the area of his method of reasoning and of the concept of genius, has 
been widely recognized.14  
 
Marie von Brühl, whom Clausewitz married in 1810, was another important source 
of cultural and philosophical education for Clausewitz. In 1787, her father, Charles 
                                                        
11 Karl Linnebach (ed.), Karl und Marie von Clausewitz: Ein Lebensbild in Briefen 
und Tagebuchblättern (Berlin: Verlag Martin Warneck, 1916), p. 83. On 
Clausewitz’s early education see also Paret (1985), pp. 36ff. 
12 Paret (1985), p. 71. 
13 Erich Weniger, ‘Philosophie und Bildung im Denken for Clausewitz’, in Walther 
Hubatsch (ed.), Schicksalswege deutscher Vergangenheit (Düsseldorf: Droste 
Verlag, 1950), p. 141. 
14 E.g. Paret (1985), p. 161; Strachan (2007), pp. 90ff.; José Fernández Vega, ‘War 
as “Art”: Aesthetics and Politics in Clausewitz’s Social Thinking’, in Strachan and 
Herberg-Rothe (eds) (2007), pp. 122-137. 
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von Brühl, had become the governor of the Prussian crown prince, the later 
Frederick William III. In contrast to Carl, Marie had enjoyed a diligent education; 
she spoke French and English fluently and had taken lessons in history and fine 
arts.15 In the above-cited 1807 letter to Marie, Clausewitz promised her to catch up 
on whatever cultural education he may be lacking: ‘wherever you find me wanting, 
I will soon improve in your proximity and under the influence of your entire noble 
being’.16 During his time in Paris as a prisoner of war, urged on by Marie, he visited 
picture galleries and studied the paintings of Rubens and Raffael, but he reported 
back to his fiancée that his lack of knowledge of the fine arts prevented him from 
finding immediate intellectual access to them.17 On another occasion, Marie 
seemed to have urged Clausewitz to take up an instrument, to which he replied 
that he had regretfully no talent at all for music.18 
 
However, the letters between Carl and Marie reflect that there was one area in 
which Clausewitz matched his fiancée’s knowledge and enjoyment of the arts: the 
theatre. It played an important role for the development of their relationship, as 
the theatre was one of the few places where Carl and Marie, whose social 
backgrounds were worlds apart, could meet informally.19 Their correspondence 
reflects that they had a joint admiration for Friedrich Schiller’s dramas in 
particular. Schiller is the figure mentioned most often in Carl’s letters to Marie; 
Clausewitz was familiar with many of his plays, had read his History of the Thirty 
Years’ War and cited at least one of his poems.20 Two of Schiller’s dramas stand out 
as apparently particularly significant for both Carl and Marie: Wallenstein and the 
Maid of Orleans. In his letters to Marie, Clausewitz compared himself more than 
                                                        
15 Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman behind the Making 
of On War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 13ff.  
16 Linnebach (1916), p. 83. 
17 Linnebach (1916), p. 108. 
18 Linnebach (1916), p.  110. 
19 Marie wrote in her notes on her acquaintance with Carl: ‘Most often I saw him in 
the theatre [in der Komödie]’; Linnebach (1916), p. 45. 
20 See also Paret’s preface to the 2007 edition of Clausewitz and the State, p. xii: 
‘Clausewitz’s appreciation of the works of Schiller deserves further study’. 
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once to the young and idealistic yet tragic figure of Max Piccolomini from 
Wallenstein.21 Carl proposed to Marie on the occasion of their watching together 
the Maid of Orleans at least for the second time on 25 May 1806.22 
 
The topic of both Wallenstein and the Maid of Orleans is war. Schiller’s perspective 
on war was ambivalent, in particular in his Wallenstein trilogy, which he completed 
in 1799. On the one hand, he depicted both Wallenstein and the Emperor as 
morally corrupt figures and war itself as a bloody and senseless business. On the 
other hand – and this must have appealed to the young Clausewitz, who knew that 
rapid advancement through the ranks was his only chance of marrying Marie – the 
figure of Max Piccolomini embodies the promise of a meritocratic military system 
and, by extension, a meritocratic and republican society.23 The Maid of Orleans, 
completed in 1801, is less ambivalent about war, even though the disruption of 
established gender relations, epitomized in the figure of the warrior-woman 
Johanna, indicates that war itself is a deeply disruptive force. And yet, the Maid of 
Orleans establishes an analogy between the moral education and empowerment of 
the individual and the possibility of national catharsis and rebirth.24 
 
Clausewitz, who grew increasingly disheartened and gloomy about the chances of 
Prussia’s revival after the Tilsit peace treaty of July 1807, echoed the idea of a 
national catharsis in a letter to Marie from 1 September 1807: ‘But if men have 
degraded our human nature, then men must be able to ennoble it again; I do not 
talk of peace and its feeble measures; war opens up a wide field of energetic 
measures, and if I were to confide in you the most secret thoughts of my soul, I am 
in favour of the most violent [measures]; I would rouse the languid animal with 
                                                        
21 In 1808 he wrote to Marie: ‘I have recently reread “Wallenstein”. How 
wonderful, divine, tender and pure are Max and Thekla!’; Linnebach (1916), p. 156, 
see also p. 83. 
22 Bellinger (2015), p. 64.  
23 Elisabeth Krimmer, The Representation of War in German Literature: From 1800 
to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 35. 
24 Krimmer (2010), p. 45.  
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whiplashes and teach it to break the chains that it allowed itself to be shackled 
in.’25 
 
The idea of war as an educational experience for the individual and a 
transformative process for the community in the widest sense was not confined to 
Schiller – it was widespread in German literature and philosophy in the early years 
of the nineteenth century. Theodor Körner, Ernst Moritz Arndt and Heinrich von 
Kleist are seen as paradigmatic examples in this context, as are Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte’s (more on whom below) 1808 Addresses to the German Nation. But not only 
romantic authors but also confessed liberals and humanists such as Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, whom Clausewitz met in Berlin around 1809, linked the experience of 
war to the concept of Bildung, education.26 Even Kant himself, though most 
commonly interpreted as a die-hard pacifist owing to his paradigmatic pamphlet 
on Perpetual Peace (1795), recognized the sublime quality of war:  
War itself, if it is carried on with order and with a sacred respect for the rights of 
citizens, has something sublime in it, and makes the disposition of the people who 
carry it on thus, only the more sublime, the more numerous are the dangers to 
which they are exposed, and in respect of which they behave with courage. On the 
other hand, a long peace generally brings about a predominant commercial spirit, 
and along with it, low selfishness, cowardice, and effeminacy, and debases the 
disposition of the people.27 
This is the intellectual context in which Clausewitz and his fellow reformers 
developed their ideas of a people’s war against French occupation. There can be no 
doubt that Clausewitz was not only aware of this context; rather, he engaged with 
many of its ideas and concepts. He did so in his letters to Marie in which aesthetic 
                                                        
25 Linnebach (1916), p. 135. 
26 Felix Saure, ‘Agamemnon on the Battlefield of Leipzig: Wilhelm fon Humboldt on 
Ancient Warriors, Modern Heroes, and Bildung through War’, in Elisabeth 
Krimmer and Patricia Anne Simpson (eds) Enlightened War: German Theories and 
Cultures of Warfare from Frederick the Great to Clausewitz (New York: Camden 
House, 2011), pp. 75-102. 
27 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, Werkausgabe vol X (Frankfurt a. M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1974 [1790]), §9. 
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contemplations are interwoven with political comments and military 
considerations. The importance of late-Enlightenment/German idealist aesthetic 
concepts for the young Clausewitz is further highlighted by the fact that he wrote 
four fragments on aesthetic theory, which Paret dates to 1808 or 1809.28 It is thus 
plausible to argue that aesthetic theory and the expression of political ideals in 
works of art, and in particular the influence of Kant and Schiller, provide valuable 
hints for decoding the young Clausewitz’s conception of small wars and people’s 
war.  
  
 
The ‘most beautiful of wars’ 
 
The younger Clausewitz was not only an ardent analyst of small wars, he also 
became a practitioner of small war in the framework of the wars of liberation. In 
1810 and 1811 he lectured at the Berlin Kriegsschule, the war academy, on the 
subject of small wars.29 In his lectures, he referenced eighteenth century classics 
on petite guerre such as Gerhard von Scharnhorst ‘pocket manual’ on the subject 
and the writings of Johann von Ewald and Andreas Emmerich. These practitioner-
scholars largely treated small wars as a tactical subset of large wars. 
Unsurprisingly, Clausewitz himself in his lectures focused on the tactical nature of 
small wars. However, the eighteenth century context was by no means irrelevant 
for Clausewitz’s further intellectual development. On the contrary, he extrapolated 
from his analysis of the tactical nature of small wars their strategic potential as 
                                                        
28 ‘Über Kunst und Kunsttheorie’; ‘Über den Begriff des körperlich Schönen’; 
‘Architektonische Rhapsodien’, all undated, printed in Schering (1941), pp. 153ff. 
The essay entitled ‘Über den Begriff des körperlich Schönen’ reads like a short 
synopsis of Kant’s third Critique for Clausewitz’s personal use. Paret (1985), p. 
163. 
29 Carl von Clausewitz, ‘Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg’, Carl von Clausewitz: 
Schriften – Aufsätze – Studien – Briefe, vol I, edited by Werner Hahlweg (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), pp. 208-599. An English translation has been 
published recently: Clausewitz on Small War, edited and translated by James W 
Davis and Christopher Daase (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 19-168. 
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well as their exemplary nature for the study of war as such. Smalls wars, he wrote 
in his lecture script are ‘particularly interesting’ because they require a 
combination of ‘audacity and caution’ and hence illustrate the ‘free play of the 
spirit [Geist]’ – a notion to which Clausewitz returned in his famous trinity in book 
I, chapter one of On War.30  
 
As a member of the Prussian reform movement, Clausewitz also played a central 
part in the plans for a popular insurrection against Napoleon’s occupation of 
Prussia. In his letters to Gneisenau between 1809 and 1812 Clausewitz reviewed 
various options to leave Prussia in order to fight against Napoleon.31 In September 
1811 Clausewitz submitted a plan for ‘Operations in Silesia’ to Gneisenau, for 
which neither of them had official backing at the time.32 Between 1808 and 1812 
Gneisenau himself, as well as Clausewitz’s mentor Gerhard von Scharnhorst, 
worked on plans for a popular insurrection against French occupation, plans that 
were in explicit breach of the terms of the 1807 peace treaty of Tilsit.33 As is well 
                                                        
30 Clausewitz, ‘Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg’, p. 239. The notion of the ‘free 
play’ of the spirit or of all human faculties first appeared in Gotthold Ephraim 
Lessing’s Laokoon (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2012 [1766]), p. 26. Kant (1974 [1790]), §9, 
also used it in the Critique of Judgment. For both Lessing and Kant the ‘free play’ 
indicated that the experience of beauty had to transcend the level of sensual 
perception and had to engage reason. Hence Lessing’s and Kant’s aesthetics were 
fundamentally rationalist. For Schiller, sensibility and reason had to be engaged in 
equal measure in the experience of beauty in order to realize the ideal of freedom. 
Frederick Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-examination (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), pp. 233f. 
31 E.g. letter from Clausewitz to Gneisenau from 29 January 1811, printed in Carl 
von Clausewitz, Schriften – Aufsätze – Studien – Briefe vol I, edited by Hahlweg, p. 
638. 
32 Letter from Clausewitz to Gneisenau from 13 September 1811, printed in 
Hahlweg (1966), p. 661ff. 
33 August Neidhardt von Gneisenau, Denkschriften zum Volksaufstand von 1808 und 
1811, edited by Harald von Koenigswald (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1936); 
Gerhard von Scharnhorst, Private und dienstliche Schriften, vol V, edited by Michael 
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known, Clausewitz left Prussian service on 18 April 1812 in order to join the 
Russian forces fighting against Napoleon. He joined the Russo-German Legion, 
which effectively fought as an auxiliary force to the regular Russian army,  and 
served as its chief of staff. In February 1813 Clausewitz and his fellow reformers 
Yorck and Dohna gave orders to raise an East Prussian Landwehr after Yorck had 
signed the Convention of Tauroggen which ended the Franco-Prussian alliance – 
both without the consent of the king.  
 
The most notable of the texts that Clausewitz wrote in the years 1806 to 1813 is 
his Bekenntnisdenkschrift of February 1812.34 This document was not intended for 
immediate publication; instead, Clausewitz only circulated it among some of his 
friends and fellow Prussian reformers. Clausewitz’s theory of war has often been 
described as battle-centric; however, in the text, he presented battle in a light that 
is very different from the central relevance that battle holds in On War.35 The 
mobilization and unification of all insurrectionary forces, Clausewitz wrote, could 
turn the tide of victory against the French occupation forces, thereby becoming 
more decisive than the ‘dubious fortune of battles’.36  In his plans for the 
mobilization of Landwehr (militia) and Landsturm (insurrection) forces, he made it 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Sikora (Hamburg: Böhlau, 2009), p. 434. Gneisenau’s 1811 memorandum on the 
Landsturm, which he and Scharnhorst jointly submitted to the Prussian chancellor 
Karl August von Hardenberg, served as the template for the 1813 Landsturmedikt.  
In the Landsturmedikt, the Prussian king sanctioned the organization of a popular 
insurrection against the Napoleonic forces. However, the edict was never 
implemented and was weakened to the point of suspension by a revision of 17 July 
1813.  
34 ‘Bekenntnisdenkschrift’, printed in Hahlweg (1966), pp. 682ff – I am using my 
own translations of the German edition, since Paret and Moran unfortunately did 
not include the full text of the Bekenntnisdenkschrift in their edition of Clausewitz’s 
historical and political writings. 
35 ‘But since the essence of war is fighting, and since the battle is the fight of the 
main force, the battle must always be considered as the true center of gravity of 
the war.’ On War, book IV, ch. 9, p. 248 [Vom Kriege, p. 453]. 
36 ‘Bekenntnisdenkschrift’, p. 733 – emphasis added. 
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clear that these forces were not intended as a mere reserve for the regular army. 
Rather, he explicitly argued that they should stay away from any major 
engagements. Their role was supposed to be modelled on the historical examples 
of the popular uprisings in the Tyrol, Spain and the Vendée, meaning that they 
were intended to cut off the opponent from his supplies and prevent him from 
requisitioning resources from the local population. In such a role, Clausewitz 
argued, the Landsturm would be a ‘terrifying force’ and it would be ‘decisive’:37 ‘A 
general cause becomes prevalent and the skill, power and greatness of the 
individual man [Napoleon, presumably] is shattered like a small skiff by the furious 
waves of the stormy sea.’38 In this situation, the occupying power would find itself 
fighting ‘this most unfortunate [unglükseeligste] of wars’.39 
 
In his letter to the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte of 11 January 1809, 
Clausewitz had matched the notion of the ‘most unfortunate of wars’, viewed from 
the perspective of the occupying power, with the term of the ‘most beautiful of 
wars’, which described the perspective of the defending side in a people’s war.40 
He explained that ‘the most beautiful of wars’ was a war ‘in which a people fights 
on its own territory for its freedom and independence’.41 Clausewitz’s letter 
referred to an article that Fichte had published in 1807 entitled ‘Machiavelli’. 
Clausewitz criticized Machiavelli and, by extension, Fichte’s take on Machiavelli, 
for trying to revert back to classical forms of warfare, whereas Clausewitz himself 
argued that reviving the classical spirit was what was needed. He explained: 
The modern art of war, far from using men as simple machines, must vitalize their 
energies as far as the nature of its weapons permits. There are of course limits to 
this, as it is an indispensable requirement for mass armies that a sensible will can 
lead them without too much friction [Reibung]. 
                                                        
37 ‘Bekenntnisdenkschrift’, pp. 720ff – emphasis added. 
38 ‘Bekenntnisdenkschrift’, p. 733. 
39 ‘Bekenntnisdenkschrift’, p. 731 – emphasis added. 
40 ‘Ein ungenannter Militär an Fichte’, printed in Schering (1941), p. 72 – emphasis 
added. Again I am using my own translation in order to avoid some inaccuracies in 
Paret’s and Moran’s edition. 
41 ‘Ein ungenannter Militär an Fichte’, p. 71. 
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But this should be the natural limit, and one should not, as was the tendency in the 
eighteenth century, try to form the whole into an artificial machine, in which the 
moral forces are subordinate to the mechanical forces, the effect of which is achieved 
through a simple mechanism, which are supposed to defeat the enemy through mere 
forms, and in which the individual is given the smallest task for the use of its 
intellectual forces. The history of all citizens’ wars [bürgerliche Kriege], and in 
particular the Swiss war of independence and the French Revolutionary War, 
demonstrate that one can achieve infinitely more by vitalizing individual energies 
than by relying on artificial forms. 42 
In this context, victory is presented as the result of the moral and intellectual 
strengths of the individual. That the individual and not the collective is the starting 
point of a potential political rebirth of Prussia (and, in fact, possibly of Germany 
and the whole of Europe) is a thought that Clausewitz had developed early. In 
1806, he wrote to Marie from the cantonment in the county of Mansfeld: ‘The 
troops that are passing by give a truly aesthetic impression, but one that is quite 
different from our military parades. While the latter display rigid formations, here 
you can clearly discern the individual in all its singularity in the open ranks, and the 
steady movement of the procession coexists with diversity and the full expression 
of life.’43 The notion of individuality would later recur in his lectures on small war, 
even though in the context of those lectures it had a merely tactical meaning: ‘The 
individual Hussar and Jäger has an enterprising spirit, a confidence in himself and 
his luck that is barely known to him who always served in the line.’44 In his concept 
of people’s war, Clausewitz effectively fused the tactical capacity of the individual 
in small wars with the transformative potential in aesthetic-moral terms of 
people’s war.45 
 
                                                        
42 ‘Ein ungenannter Militär an Fichte’, pp. 71ff. 
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Paret (2015), p. 46; Saure (2011), p. 87. 
44 Clausewitz, ‘Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg’, pp. 237f. 
45 On this fusion see in more detail Heuser (2010), pp. 139-62. 
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It was from the perspective of the centrality of the individual that Clausewitz took 
issue with the argument Fichte put forward in his Machiavelli text: faced with the 
dilemma of how to free the individual from the shackles of a corrupted political 
system and society, Fichte’s position after 1800 vacillated between ‘conscious, 
collective, transformative action’ on the one hand and the ‘imposition of constraint 
in order to raise individuals to the practice of virtue’ on the other. The latter was 
the gist of the Machiavelli text.46 Fichte believed that the warrior ethos instilled by 
the modalities of ancient warfare was an important potential source of such virtue. 
Clausewitz disagreed: 
Surely in ancient times the value of the individual warrior was generated more by 
their civic constitution [bürgerliche Verfassung] than their way of fighting, which is 
even more undeniable given that those peoples who proved themselves in war 
differed from the defeated with respect to their civic constitution rather than their 
being accustomed to personal combat.47 
Against Fichte, Clausewitz emphasized the transformative potential of the 
individual. He acknowledged the potentially vicious circle consisting of a corrupted 
political system that suppressed the moral qualities of its individuals, hence 
making it difficult for individuals to unfold their full potential. However, the ‘most 
beautiful of wars’ appeared to be the way out of this conundrum.  
 
What did Clausewitz mean by the phrase ‘the most beautiful of wars’? In his 
writings, he never ceased to emphasize the cruelty of war, the violence and the 
destruction – in fact, he repeatedly exhorted his readers to face up to the gruesome 
realities of mass warfare. So surely Clausewitz did not think that people’s war, 
which he saw as particularly atrocious, was an uplifting or aesthetically pleasing 
spectacle.48 The answer to this puzzle lies in Clausewitz’s reception of the aesthetic 
writings of his time, and in particular those of Kant and Schiller. 
 
                                                        
46 Douglas Moggach, ‘Fichte’s Engagement with Machiavelli’, History of Political 
Thought, 14:4 (1993), p. 589. 
47 ‘Ein ungenannter Militär an Fichte’, pp. 72ff. 
48 ‘Bekenntnisdenkschrift’, p. 733. 
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Kant wrote his third critique not with a view to founding an aesthetic theory in the 
sense of a theory of art, but to close a gap in his epistemology. According to Kant, 
knowledge based on experiences involves three faculties: sensibility, imagination, 
and understanding. The third of these faculties, understanding, allows the human 
mind to sort its experiences according to rational concepts. The characteristic 
feature of the aesthetic experience, according to Kant, is that it initiates a process 
in which sensibility and understanding enter into a ‘free play’ of ‘harmonious 
activity’ in which neither gains the upper hand, as it were, but one furthers the 
other and vice versa.49 This evidently indicates that rationality – understanding – 
plays a central part in the aesthetic experience, but it is not its ultimate arbiter. The 
process is an infinite one, meaning that the mind never arrives at a ‘concept’, at an 
ultimate interpretation.  
 
Kant’s idea of beauty comprises a number of features: beauty is a concrete 
experience; it is sensual without being linked to immediate interests (such as 
appetite or sexual desire); the experience of beauty is inherently social as the 
judgment of taste is universal even though it cannot be subsumed under a rational 
concept; finally, the experience of beauty has a vitalizing effect on all human 
faculties, in as much as they enter into a free play of harmonious activity.  
 
Most importantly, however, for Kant, ‘The beautiful is the symbol of the morally 
good’.50 The concept of morality inhabits the realm of rationality, but it cannot be 
experienced through the senses. Moral notions such as freedom can be derived in a 
rational way, but they lack empirical demonstrability. In this sense, the experience 
of beauty is the counterpart of the concept of morality: the first is empirical 
without ever arriving at a rational concept, the second is conceptual, but devoid of 
empirical content.  
 
Against this background, Clausewitz’s notion of the ‘most beautiful of wars’ makes 
more sense: what it hints at is the moral value or character that a people’s war 
against French occupation had in Clausewitz’s eyes. Such an interpretation gains 
                                                        
49 Kant (1974 [1790]), §9. 
50 Kant (1974 [1790]), §59. 
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additional plausibility when we take into account Clausewitz’s closing statement in 
his letter to Fichte, where he wrote that he believed that people’s war ‘will 
overcome any other art of war, however perfect a product of reason the latter may 
be, not to mention that it [people’s war] would according to its nature come closest 
to the most perfect form [ihrer Natur nach sich der vollkommensten Form am 
meisten nähern würde].’51  
 
‘Freedom’ is the next central term that defines the ‘most beautiful of wars’. As we 
have seen above, such a war is defined as one being fought by a people ‘on its own 
territory for its freedom and independence’.52 This is where Schiller’s aesthetics 
come into play. In his aesthetic letters, Schiller wrote that ‘beauty is the only 
possible expression of freedom in appearance’.53 Schiller built on Kantian aesthetic 
theory, which had already emphasized the link between beauty and freedom. This 
link existed both in the sense that the experience of beauty liberated the individual 
from desire and in the sense that beauty was a symbol of the morally good, in the 
framework of which, in turn, freedom played a central role.54 
 
In the context of Schiller’s philosophy, beauty and art became the centrepiece of 
his emancipatory project. Schiller and Clausewitz, and Fichte, for that matter, 
shared some core convictions: they deplored the moral and political weakness of 
Prussia and the hopeless situation of Germany in the face of French expansion 
                                                        
51 ‘Ein ungenannter Militär an Fichte’, pp. 73ff. Here Clausewitz follows Schiller’s 
argument of beauty as a regulative ideal that can only be reached through the 
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53 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, translated by Reginald 
Snell (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004), letter 23 – emphasis added. 
54 Kai Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), p. 29. 
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more broadly and they emphasized the need to overcome this situation through 
education. Schiller’s diagnosis of the political and social ills of his times was 
twofold: the upper strata of society were ‘overrefined’ and, as a result, suffered 
from languor and permissiveness and a general lack of energy and vitality. 55  This 
is a charge that Clausewitz too made in the Bekenntnisdenkschrift, where he argued 
that Prussia’s political elites masked their fears as rational decisions and, as a 
result, became paralysed and incapable of action: 
Reason alone is supposed to decide, everyone demands. As if fear weren’t an 
expression of the mind [Gemüth – more emotional than rational], as if it would allow 
for a free judgement of reason. All that can be granted is that both confessions of 
faith, that in favour of resistance and that in favour of subservience, emanate equally 
from the mind [Gemüth], but that the first is fuelled by courage, whereas the second 
is fuelled by fear. Fear paralyses reason, whereas courage energizes it.56 
If Schiller, who wrote his aesthetic letters under the impression of the reign of 
terror in revolutionary France, did not appreciate the decadence of the ruling 
classes, he did not have much trust in the moral resources of the people either. 
Whereas the elites were given to decadence, he argued, the ‘numerous classes’, if 
let loose, displayed ‘barbarity’.57 The central question for Schiller, then, was how to 
break out of the vicious circle of the corruption of the state and its elites on the one 
hand and the lack of education of society, which stifled the attainment of freedom 
by the individual, on the other. Schiller’s solution consisted in the idea of the 
‘aesthetic state’, a political collective that comes into existence once human beings 
have transformed themselves into holistic individuals through aesthetic education: 
‘The aesthetic state alone regards us as whole beings, as both rational and sensible, 
because we participate in social life from inclination rather than duty. […] Only in 
beauty do we bring together both universal and individual, the will of the whole 
and the nature of the individual.’58 
 
                                                        
55 Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education, letter 5; cf. Hammermeister (2002), p. 48. 
56 ‘Bekenntnisdenkschrift’, p. 707. 
57 Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education, letter 5. 
58 Beiser (2005), p. 163. 
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It was Fichte who pointed out the essential weakness of Schiller’s ideas, in an 
article entitled ‘Ueber Geist und Buchstab in der Philosophie’ (‘On the Spirit and the 
Letter in Philosophy’) that Fichte submitted in 1794 to the journal that Schiller 
edited, entitled Die Horen: 
[I]f it is on the one hand not advisable to give freedom to man before his aesthetic 
sense is developed, it is on the other hand impossible to develop the latter before he 
is free; and the idea to lead man to the appreciation of freedom through aesthetic 
education and hence to freedom itself gets us into a vicious circle unless we find a 
means beforehand of awakening the courage in some individuals out of the great 
multitude to be nobody’s master and nobody’s slave.59 
Unsurprisingly, Schiller refused to publish Fichte’s article. 
 
Clausewitz was not convinced by Schiller’s aesthetic utopia either:  
A nation cannot break free from the slavery of foreign domination through the arts 
and sciences. It has to throw itself into the ferocious element of fighting [ins wilde 
Element des Kampfes]; to gamble a thousand lives for the thousand-fold gain of life. 
Only thus can it rise from the sickbed to which foreign bonds had shackled it.60 
In other words, for Clausewitz fighting was the way out of the vicious circle of the 
corruption of state and society on the one hand and the lack of individual moral 
qualities on the other. In this context, Clausewitz, then, remained true to his 
combat-centric perspective on war, but he harnessed his belief in the centrality of 
combat to his views on the possibility of political emancipation. 
 
This is not to say that Clausewitz did not realize the chicken and egg problem that 
Fichte and Schiller were grappling with. In the Bekenntnisdenkschrift, in which he 
often weighed his arguments against possible counter-arguments, he considered 
that the government may have to give the first impetus to a general insurrection, 
should the people not take up arms on their own account: ‘There is a form of 
coercion, and even terrible coercion, which is not tyranny.’ And yet, his trust in the 
emancipatory spirit of the people re-asserted itself just a few lines below: ‘Nothing 
                                                        
59 Fichte quoted in Hammermeister (2002), p. 59. 
60 ‘Vergleich zwischen den europäischen Staaten’, printed in Schering (1941), p. 7 – 
emphasis added.  
 20 
is as true as that extraordinary adversity, once man decides to confront it with 
extraordinary means and to focus all his forces against it, conduce him to rise 
above himself and excite the forces of the mind [Gemüth] and reason of which he 
himself was not aware.’61 The free play of passion and reason, which was at the 
heart of Schiller’s idea of freedom, enabled Clausewitz’s individual to rise above all 
internal and external constraints. 
 
In contrast to both Fichte and Schiller, however, Clausewitz evidently did not fear 
that a sudden empowerment of the people could unleash forces that would 
inevitably turn against the emancipatory project. Such concern was common in 
German literary and philosophical circles around 1800. It found its probably most 
famous expression in Goethe’s exclamation at the end of the Sorcerer’s Apprentice 
‘from the spirits that I called/Sir, deliver me!’ Clausewitz, on the contrary, 
anticipated a general insurrection to be met with particularly cruel and ferocious 
measures by the French (he had studied the war in the Vendée and the Peninsular 
War, after all) and exhorted his fellow Prussians to outbid the cruelty of 
Napoleon’s forces:  ‘Let us take our chances at paying back atrocity with atrocity, at 
reciprocating cruelty for cruelty! It will be easy for us to outbid the enemy and to 
lead him back into the boundaries of restraint and humanity.’62 
 
Traces of Clausewitz’s early writings on people’s war can still be found in On War. 
In book VI, chapter 26, the chapter on ‘People’s War’, Clausewitz wrote: 
No matter how small and weak a state may be in comparison with its enemy, it must 
not forego these last efforts [popular insurrection], or one would conclude that its 
soul is dead. […] A government that after having lost a major battle, is only interested 
in letting its people go back to sleep in peace as soon as possible, and, overwhelmed 
by feelings of failure and disappointment, lacks the courage and desire to put forth a 
final effort, is, because of its weakness, involved in a major inconsistency in any case. 
It shows that it did not deserve to win, and, possibly for that very reason was unable 
to.63 
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Absolutism was the heyday of body metaphors and body politics, as the seminal 
studies of Kantorowicz, Elias and Foucault have shown. The state was imagined as 
a body, personified in the absolutist ruler, who was also often depicted as its soul, 
mind or spirit that animated his or her subjects.64 Clausewitz attributed this 
animating function, the image of the soul, to the people. But the notion of the soul 
also played a role in the framework of German aesthetic theory. One of the first 
attempts to push beyond the Cartesian dualism of the body and the soul was made 
by Julien Offray de la Mettrie in his 1747 essay entitled ‘L’homme machine’. In this 
essay, de la Mettrie imagined the human body as some kind of mechanical 
clockwork and the soul as its – equally mechanic – extension. In his 1793 essay 
Anmut und Würde [Grace and Dignity] Schiller aimed to de-mechanize the soul 
while at the same time retaining its synthetic connection with the body: grace is 
physical beauty in motion, animated by the soul.65 There are echoes of this anti-
mechanistic impetus in Clausewitz’s letter to Fichte, where he repeatedly pitched 
the moral forces of the individual against the mechanical, over-rationalized 
machine-like tendencies of eighteenth century military organization.66 
 
However, since Schiller’s aesthetic theory is inherently a theory of morality, the 
significance of the soul for Schiller went further. In Anmut und Würde he 
introduced the notion of the ‘beautiful soul’. The term stemmed initially from the 
context of German Pietism – a tradition that Clausewitz was probably familiar with 
from his childhood years.67 For Schiller, ‘A beautiful soul is someone who does 
their duty from inclination, who acts on the moral law with joy. Schiller describes 
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the beautiful soul as a person who acts with complete freedom, and therefore 
without the constraint of sensibility or the moral law.’68 
 
The beautiful soul for Schiller possessed virtue in the sense of a natural disposition 
to act according to the moral principle. In this context, Schiller further developed 
Kantian ethics based on principle and law and introduced the notion of virtue in a 
bid to render the reconciliation of passion and reason, which according to Kant 
only occurred during the experience of beauty, more sustainable in time. This idea 
resonates deeply with Clausewitz’s notion of passion and reason, in particular as 
he represented it in his letter to Fichte, where he continued to emphasize that 
passion and reason have to be integrated in order to enable both victory in the 
‘most beautiful of wars’ and the emancipation of the individual. It is not surprising 
that he ended his letter with the speculation that warrior virtue could be partly 
instilled by good military leadership, but had to rely on the primordial moral 
qualities of the individual in the first place.69  
 
 
Small wars and people’s war after the reform years 
 
Clausewitz’s concept of people’s war is an eminently political one. This resonates 
with recent research that has shown that Clausewitz did not develop the idea of 
war as a political act late in the process of writing On War.70 On the contrary, the 
political character of war was an element of Clausewitz’s thinking that evolved 
from his earliest writings, in particular those on people’s war. Of specific 
importance in this respect is the relationship between passion and reason. ‘The 
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most beautiful of wars’ requires the integration of the dichotomy between passion 
and reason – a thought that Clausewitz developed in an intellectual ‘dialogue’ with 
the German aesthetic discourse around 1800. Passion is not something that needs 
to be suppressed in order to enable military effectiveness and political freedom; on 
the contrary, passion is an integral part of both. Without passion, the soul is dead, 
and the rational capacities of men become formalistic and idle.71 The integration of 
passion and reason is also what makes war so eminently political; in other words, 
what enables war to transform the political realm: ‘Where policy is pitted against 
passion, where hostility ousts rationality, the characteristics of war itself can 
subordinate usurp those of the “trinity” [of passion, reason and creativity].’72 
 
The integration of passion and reason is central to Clausewitz’s thought, and it 
continued to play a crucial role in his later writings. Even his essay entitled 
Umtriebe, written in the early 1820s and according to Paret ‘the most puzzling of 
all of Clausewitz’s works’, reflects the essential gist of Clausewitz’s conception of 
people’s war.73 As Moran explained in his introduction to the text, Umtriebe was 
written at a time when Clausewitz hoped for an appointment as Prussian 
ambassador to Great Britain, and was hence at pains to distance himself from the 
revolutionary agitations of individuals such as Karl Sand, who had murdered the 
conservative August von Kotzebue in March 1819, and from the broader national 
revolutionary movement in Germany more generally.74  
 
According to Clausewitz, the root cause of these revolutionary agitations were the 
ideas put forward by ‘scholars and philosophers’: ‘these people [the agitators] 
were strongly taken with the philosophy and politics of Paris, and the majority 
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threw themselves into the maelstrom of revolutionary ideas in a wholly different 
way [than the majority of the people – die große Masse des Volkes].75 In this 
scenario, reason and passion are out of balance. The older Clausewitz became 
increasingly aware of the pitfalls of demagoguery and the danger that intellectual 
elites and interest groups could whip up the passions of the masses with the help 
of ideas that the latter were unable to grasp. Clausewitz’s lifelong ambivalence 
towards parliamentary democracy was rooted in these concerns. 
 
For Clausewitz, the involvement of the people in the defence of their country, be it 
in the framework of people’s war or in the framework of a popular militia, the 
Landwehr, were the central institutions of a reformed Prussian state and society. 
Clausewitz never ceased to defend the Landwehr against its – increasingly 
numerous and influential – detractors. In two 1819 essays, entitled ‘Our Military 
Institutions’ and ‘On the Political Advantages and Disadvantages of the Prussian 
Landwehr’, his belief in popular participation in war and the defence of the nation 
as a substitute for parliamentary democracy is fully evolved: 
But the moral power of the Landwehr also affects the way people live. When all state 
institutions are organized around an armed Landwehr, when all the state’s energies 
are directed towards it, when all officals, high and low, are instructed to treat this 
institution, which in principle knows no bounds, as an expression of the absolute 
power of the nation, then any direction imparted to it from above will produce 
entirely different results than if everything remained confined within an institution 
divorced from the people themselves.76  
Here, Clausewitz depicted the Landwehr as the only viable expression of popular 
sovereignty. In contrast to participatory democratic institutions, Clausewitz 
argued, the Landwehr fostered unity, not division; in fact, it could even be used in 
order to keep revolutionary factionalism in check:  
With this institution let the government mobilize the energies of a valiant people 
against its external enemies and rivals; with this institution let the government 
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enchain reckless forces if they turn against their own community in frenzy and 
ferment.77 
Finally, these arguments are also in line with Clausewitz’s perspective on the 
Polish question, which he elaborated in two essays in 1831, ‘Europe since the 
Polish Partitions’ and ‘On the Basic Question of Germany’s Existence’. Both essays 
have been interpreted as proof of the mature Clausewitz’s turn to political 
realism.78 It is true that Clausewitz framed his arguments against Poland’s 
restoration in terms of balance-of-power considerations and expressed the fear 
that a liberated Poland would ally itself with France.79 However, this did not signify 
a turn away from his earlier political convictions. For Clausewitz, the Polish 
rebellion of 1830-31 was not a self-defensive people’s war, not a ‘beautiful war’, in 
other words, because the Poles were not a nation (an argument he also made, to a 
lesser extent, with respect to Belgium and Italy). He denounced the Poles as a ‘very 
able people, but one that for centuries has remained half-Tartar in the midst of 
civilized European states’.80 For twenty-first century readers, this reads like a 
racist slant. It is definitely orientalist, in that it pits the Poles against the 
supposedly more civilized European states. It is also true that Clausewitz did not 
like the Poles, but his reference to their ‘Tartar’ habits probably did not aim at 
their racial origin, but at their irregular way of fighting, which linked them to the 
eighteenth century partisan warfare tradition.81 
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Clausewitz, having lectured on ‘small wars’ at the Allgemeine Kriegsschule in 1810 
and 1811, was of course familiar this tradition. While Clausewitz perceived it as an 
illustration of the tactical potential of people’s war, he became increasingly 
concerned about instances in which partisan warfare emerged in the context of 
people’s war, as had happened, for instance, with the emergence in 1813 of 
Lützow’s Free Corps. ‘Lützow’s unruly volunteers’, as Clausewitz referred to them 
in Umtriebe, had been a pan-German unit of volunteers authorized by 
Scharnhorst.82 The Free Corps had the reputation of being mainly composed of 
students and academics, and a number of them became leading figures in the 
national revolutionary movement after the war. For Clausewitz, these were 
precisely those intellectuals who were misguided by ‘revolutionary ideas’ that did 
not have any connection to the masses of the people.83 In other words, nineteenth 
century partisan warfare was no longer a mere tactical complement to regular 
warfare, as it had been in the eighteenth century; rather, it was an ideologically 
driven form of war conducted by intellectual elites that threatened to undermine 
the unity and strength,- the ‘beauty’- of people’s war. And this is precisely the 
charge that Clausewitz levelled against the Polish rebellion: it was not a people’s 
war, not a war of national self-defence, but a brainchild of ‘the political 
philosophers of our day [who] wish to reform the process of national 
development’.84 Once again, the relationship between reason and passion was 
upset, in that reason – revolutionary ideas and ideologies – tried to harness 
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popular passion to its idiosyncratic aims which were neither connected to 
realpolitik nor to the needs of the people. Even though Clausewitz grew 
increasingly aware of the danger that demagogues could try to harness the idea 
and the passion of people’s war to their own revolutionary and factionalist 
motivations, his basic convictions on the empowerment of the people in the 
framework of national self-defence did not change over time. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has argued that Clausewitz in his writings between 1806 and 1813 
sketched out an eminently political understanding of war, in which people’s war, 
which he referred to as the ‘most beautiful of wars’, possessed inherently 
liberating qualities. Clausewitz exhorted his fellow Prussians to engage in people’s 
war not only in order to rid Prussia of the yoke of Napoleonic domination, but also 
to liberate its citizens from the corruption of the Prussian late-absolutist 
monarchy. The ‘most beautiful of wars’, understood as a moral war, hence unified 
and integrated the instrumental quality of war as a liberation from foreign 
domination on the one hand and the existential quality of war as an emancipation 
of the individual through the experience of combat and the concomitant revelation 
of its inherent moral capacities.  
 
The acknowledgment of the existential aspect of war, combat and violence and its 
immediate political significance, both for the internal coherence of a nation and for 
the external power of a state, is a thought that Clausewitz took most likely from his 
mentor Scharnhorst.85 Clausewitz’s original contribution consisted in putting this 
idea on a philosophical basis, the main ingredients of which he developed in the 
framework of a ‘dialogue’ with the German aesthetic discourse around 1800, in 
particular Kant’s and Schiller’s aesthetic theories. Clausewitz largely followed 
Schiller’s aesthetic theory in its attempt to integrate reason and passion, and this 
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integration formed a core element of his concept of people’s war. In On War, this 
dichotomy was broadened to the ‘wondrous trinity’, ‘composed of primordial 
violence, hatred, and enmity’, ‘of the play of chance and probability in which the 
creative spirit is free to roam [freie Seelentätigkeit]; and of its element of 
subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason 
alone’.86 The notion of ‘freie Seelentätigkeit’ itself is a reincarnation of the ‘freie 
Spiel des Geistes’, a notion that Clausewitz had already used in 1810/11 to describe 
the characteristic feature of small wars. Finally, the way in which Clausewitz, in 
analogy to Schiller’s aesthetics, used the notion of the ‘most beautiful of wars’ as a 
regulative ideal, something that approaches the ‘most perfect form’ of war 
recurred in the notion of ‘absolute war’ in book VIII of On War, when Clausewitz 
described the era of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars as a time in 
which war had reached a ‘state of absolute perfection’.87  
 
Reconstructing Clausewitz’s writings against the backdrop of his intellectual and 
political context highlights that his conception of small wars does not provide a 
timeless ‘wisdom’ that can be applied to twenty-first century problems. The 
strategic context in which he lived and which he analysed is about as far removed 
from the strategic context of Western states today as it could be. Most European 
countries – the current exception being the Baltic states and Eastern Europe – are 
surrounded by friends. Moreover, after almost two centuries of mass conscription 
(again, there are exceptions) most Western states have turned away from 
conscription and the ideal of the citizen-soldier as the foundation of their national 
and collective defence. The increasing professionalization of Western armed forces 
is the flipside of the abolition of conscription.88 
 
However, Clausewitz asked a pertinent question, and one that is today probably 
more relevant than ever: how to integrate reason and passion in politics and war. 
For Clausewitz, the first step to achieve this integration was the involvement of the 
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people in the defence of their own country. Clausewitz was right in assuming that 
the nationalization of war that had started with the French Revolution was to 
transform war in Europe for a long time and that it was deeply entangled with 
political transformations and the democratization of war and politics. Conversely, 
the increasing professionalization of Western armed forces will require a new 
balance or a new alignment in the relationship between reason and passion in war. 
Today’s debates in strategic studies indicate that Clausewitz’s question is still of 
central importance: from the debate over ‘post-heroic’ societies and the lament 
over the decline in republican virtues to the observation that Western wars today 
are essentially conducted ‘without the people’, there is a sense that reason and 
passion are again out of balance.89 Clausewitz’s conception of small wars and 
people’s war focuses the mind on this issue, even though the answers he gave 
reflect his early nineteenth-century context and cannot be readily applied to the 
twenty-first century. 
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